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Abstract 
The Sphere standards have been devised to ensure that people affected by disasters will receive an 
adequate level of assistance; these standards are used across the world and apply both to natural and 
complex emergencies. The latter tend to be lasting events that often create a displacement of the 
population and it is argued that in such situations, where prolonged assistance is required, the Sphere 
standards may be counterproductive. By using examples of water supply interventions, it is highlighted 
that in some circumstances the Sphere standards for water quality may only be achieved with systems 
too complex for the displaced population to operate and maintain on their own. The case of two war-
affected areas of Eastern Chad are presented to illustrate the importance of the temporal aspects of the 
Sphere standards in complex emergencies, and raises important questions regarding the long-term 
sustainability of adopting such standards for displaced populations. 
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Sphere and sustainability: A matter of time 
Introduction  
Since the early 1990s, donors and aid agencies have been increasingly concerned about quality and accountability in disaster 
response (van Brabant, 2002). One of the consequences of these concerns was the creation of the Sphere project, which 
consists of a rights charter and quality standards for aid agencies involved in providing assistance to people affected by 
disasters. Sphere applies to disasters caused by natural hazards and human-induced complex emergencies; the standards 
encompass the provision of water, sanitation, and hygiene, food, shelter, and health services (Sphere, 2004). 
Sphere determines suitable levels of assistance that should be provided in post-disaster situations until individual and 
collective coping mechanisms can be put in place by the affected population, local authorities or both. The assistance 
strategy underpinning Sphere conforms to the ‘conventional’ definition of disasters: “serious disruptions of the functioning 
of a society” (UNISDR, 2004:Annex1). This implies that emergency situations resulting from disasters are time-bounded 
events, and assistance is confined within a certain timescale.  
This may be pertinent for most disasters associated with natural hazards but experience has shown that it is much less so in 
the case of complex emergencies, which are not linear events with well-defined beginnings and ends. Such events tend to be 
drawn out over months and years (Goodhand and Hulme, 1999); examples are many, in particular in Africa where countries 
such as Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Uganda, Burundi, to cite a few, have experienced unresolved 
conflicts rooted in the 1990s or earlier. The affected population often needs to leave their homes and it may take years 
before they are able to return. Consequently, when displaced populations do not become integrated into the host population, 
they may live in ‘emergency conditions’ over prolonged periods.  
The levels of assistance recommended by Sphere have not been formulated to be provided over an extended timescale, 
therefore, when crises perpetuate, agencies are unable to sustain full support and the affected population has to find coping 
mechanisms within their new environment; for instance to find new livelihoods such as farming, fishing or selling firewood 
to substitute food aid. When it comes to assistance involving infrastructures such as water supply, the problem which often 
arises is whether the displaced population possess the skills and resources to maintain the systems put at their disposal in 
order to compensate for diminishing external support. In other words, after some time, the issue of the sustainability of such 
systems becomes increasingly important. 
3 
 
This problem is quite common, especially in very poor countries, where the sophistication of the systems installed by aid 
agencies may be far above what both local and displaced population are used to. Drawing upon observations and 
quantitative surveys conducted during field visits in Eastern Chad, this paper highlights some of the key problems 
associated with applying the Sphere standards to complex emergencies and raises important questions regarding the long-
term sustainability of adopting such standards for displaced populations. 
The Displaced Population of Eastern Chad 
Chad is located in the centre of the Sahel region, a semi arid fringe crossing the African continent, south of the Sahara 
desert. Since the end of the 1960s, Chad has been one amongst many African countries that has been affected by long-
lasting crises associated with a number of civil wars; two of Chad’s neighbours, Libya to the north and Sudan to the east 
(see Figure 1) allegedly played a significant role in this civil unrest by supporting rebel groups (Decalo 1980; Collins 2007). 
In recent years, the displacement of people affected in the Eastern region of Chad has been largely the result of both the war 
in the Sudanese region of Darfur and the armed rebellion to the government (BBC, 2009). Since 2004, about 250,000 non-
Arab Sudanese refugees have arrived in Chad, fleeing the violence by the Janjawid Arab militia. They regrouped in a dozen 
of camps along the border, most of which are located north of the regional capital Abéché. The number of refugees 
increased by about 12,000 in the first half of 2008, following renewed violence in Darfur (ICG, 2008: 22).  
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Figure 1: Map of Chad indicating the location of the case study camps (Base map provided courtesy of the University of 
Texas at Austin) 
In September 2005, the Chadian population was for the first time attacked by the Janjawid, allied to Chadian Arab tribes. 
This took place in a border village of Dar Sila ‘département’ (district), southeast of Abéché (see Figure 2). Subsequent 
attacks, which intensified in December 2006, led to the displacement of 120,000 people in Dar Sila alone. The majority of 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) took refuge in Dar Sila and in the neighbouring ‘départements’ of Djourf al Ahmar and 
Ouara. In Dar Sila, most of the IDPs went to Goz Beida, Koukou Angara and Dogdoré while others went to Adé and Kerfi 
(see Figure 2). They received assistance from a large number of organisations including Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs), the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (ICG, 2008: 24).  
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Figure 2: Displacement of population towards Dar Sila (Map based on ICG 2009:27) 
In addition to consequences related to the war in Darfur, Eastern Chad also suffered from the effects of armed rebellion. 
Rebel groups have been active in the region ever since the 1960s and in recent years, they have been supported by the 
Sudanese government and found a sanctuary in the Sudanese border city of Al Geneina (see Figure 2). Despite the presence 
of the Chadian armed forces and of international peacekeepers, their raids occurred frequently in 2008. Reports have stated 
that these armed rebels regularly attack and steal from the local population, displaced people and international organisations 
alike, thereby maintaining a climate of insecurity (ICG 2008; Sokpoh et al. 2009). Therefore the prevailing and socio-
political conditions in Eastern Chad have contributed towards a long-term complex emergency and consequently a situation 
where important questions, regarding the long-term sustainability of adopting the Sphere standards for displaced 
populations, need to be addressed. 
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The research that was undertaken 
Adé and Kerfi are two towns with IDP camps in the Dar Sila ‘département’ where the NGO ‘Médecins Sans Frontières’ 
(MSF) run clinics providing essential curative health care. Adé is located on the border with Sudan while Kerfi is located to 
the southwest of Adé (see Figure 2). They were chosen as case-study sites because they possess characteristics that illustrate 
the typical level of access to water by IDP populations and its possible evolution over time. Although the camps are small 
compared to those in Goz Beida, Koukou Angara and Dogdoré, the diversity of water systems, especially in Adé, cover 
most of the possible water supply options that can be found elsewhere. Moreover, the relatively small size of these towns 
provides advantages for conducting detailed survey-based research.  
Camp population data was provided by MSF and field observations were used to calculate average levels of water access in 
Adé and Kerfi. In addition, a quantitative survey carried out in Adé in May and June 2009 involved interviews of camp 
dwellers as well as local families. Its initial purpose was to help define the MSF water supply strategy, however, the results 
were also useful for informing the issues discussed within this paper. 
Access to Water in Adé and Kerfi IDP Camps 
IDPs started settling in Adé and Kerfi mostly as a result of the December 2006 attacks by Janjawid militias and the 
population of these towns has burgeoned in light of subsequent incidents. By 2009, the flow of IDPs had considerably 
reduced but had by no means stopped. The assistance they received, from a number of organisations consisted of food aid 
and nutrition, plastic sheeting and other non-food items, water supply, sanitation systems, hygiene promotion and health 
services. 
 
Water access in Adé in June 2009 
Adé’s IDP population in June 2009 was estimated by MSF between 9,000 and 12,000 people, while the host population was 
about 3,000 people. In addition, a contingent of 3,000 to 4,000 Chadian Army soldiers was present. IDPs were divided into 
two camps both located near to a wadi (in this context, this refers to a seasonal stream), which at the time was dry. IDPs 
received assistance from a number of organisations including the ICRC, MSF, and the French NGO “Solidarités”. All three 
organisations where involved in the provision of water supplies.  
Adé town had the rare privilege for this region of Chad to be equipped with a water distribution network. The scheme used 
33 tap-stands fed by two boreholes through an overhead tank. The system was run by Solidarités who managed the pumping 
of water into the overhead tank.  The organisation paid operators salaries and fuel for the generator supplying the pumps. It 
also disinfected the water with chlorine. Daily pumping time was 13 hours in the dry season. The tap-stands opened six 
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hours a day, every day and were used both by the local population and IDPs. In addition, Solidarités built five hand-dug 
wells, covered, and equipped with foot-operated Vergnet pumps (one of the wells was equipped with two pumps).  There 
was an additional hand-dug well, built by the ICRC, near to the wadi. It was lined with concrete but not covered, and had a 
particularly large diameter (about two metres). People fetched water with their own buckets; many could get water 
simultaneously. 
Finally, MSF was also running an emergency water supply system. It consisted of a hand-dug well dug into the bed of the 
wadi, with a well-head that was protected with sandbags (to help protect the well from being washed out during the rainy 
season). A motor-pump extracted water from the well and supplied two 15,000 litres flexible emergency tanks equipped 
with three ‘six-taps’ distribution ramps, one of which was exclusively reserved for use by the armed forces. The time of the 
visit coincided with the end of the dry season and the level of water in the well only allowed five minutes of pumping-time 
per hour, which considerably reduced the quantity of water actually supplied to the population. 
Besides protected or semi-protected water sources, the wadi was another essential water source, both for IDPs and for local 
population. Despite its poor quality, it was widely used, in most cases for laundry and to water animals and small gardens. It 
is also likely, given the long queues at taps and pumps that many people chose to drink water from the wadi to avoid 
waiting, a habit they had already adopted in their village of origin. 
 
Situation in Kerfi in June 2009 
Kerfi’s population was about 10,000 people, 5,000 of whom were IDP and the remaining 5,000 the sedentary host 
population. Up to 10,000 people from adjacent villages or nomadic populations were also present. Like in Adé, Kerfi IDP 
camp was located near to a wadi. Kerfi’s wadi offered a source of water even more essential than in Adé given the greater 
water scarcity in the area. Kerfi’s protected water sources consisted exclusively of ten deep boreholes equipped with 
Vergnet pumps (see figure 3). These boreholes were drilled by the NGO Oxfam and replaced an earlier installed emergency 
water system. 
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Figure 3: Hand-pump in Kerfi (Photo by Claire Grisaffi, compressed version) 
 
Compliance with Sphere 
Sphere water supply standard number one sets the following objective in terms of water quantity: 
“All people have safe and equitable access to sufficient quantity of water for drinking, cooking and personal and domestic 
hygiene. Public water points are sufficiently close to households to enable use of the minimum water requirement”. (Sphere, 
2004:63) 
Some of the key indicators specified are:  
‐ 15 litres per person per day; 
‐ Maximum distance from any household: 500 metres; 
‐ Maximum queuing time: 15 minutes; 
‐ Flow sufficient to fill a 20-litre container in less than three minutes. 
The level of compliance with Sphere standards in terms of water quantity of water supply in Adé and Kerfi is summarized 
in tables 1 and 2, based on MSF estimations from June 2009: 
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Table 1: Level of compliance with Sphere standards in terms of quantity of water supply in Adé 
Source Yield m3/h No. hours 
pumped per day 
Total m3/day 
33 taps (Solidarités) 7.5 13 97 
Flexible Emergency tank (MSF)   30 
Manual pump 1 (Solidarités) 1.8 10 18 
Manual pump 2 (Solidarités) 1.7 10 17 
Manual pump 3 (Solidarités) 0.75 10 7.5 
Manual pump 4 (Solidarités) 1.7 10 17 
Manual pumps 5 & 6 (fit on one 
well, Solidarités) 
3.0 10 30 
Open well (ICRC) 0.75 10 7.5 
Total  224 m3/day 
High hypothesis: per person for 19,000 population  11.7 l/day  
Low hypothesis: per person for 15,000 population 14.9 l/day 
Sphere minimum volume of water per person  15 l/day 
 
Table 2: Level of compliance with Sphere standards in terms of water quantity of water supply in Kerfi 
Source  Yield m3/hour No. hours 
pumped per 
day  
Total m3/day  
10 manual pumps  (Oxfam) 0.9 12 108  
Per person for 10,000 population  10.8 l/day
Sphere minimum volume of water per person  15 l/day
The specified number of hours of usage of manual pumps and open wells is based on observation. 
 
Sphere standards for water quantity were barely achieved in Adé in the case of the low population hypothesis, and not at all 
in Kerfi, which was significantly under the required 15 litres per person per day. The calculated amounts are conservative 
since they assumed there were no water losses. This reflects a situation of water scarcity affecting the whole region, with 
serious impacts on health, especially during the driest months. In May 2009, MSF clinics in Adé and Kerfi received 
respectively 22% and 10% patients with diarrhoeal diseases, the highest incidence of the year.  
The average daily volume of water calculated should however be taken with caution since, as pointed out in the guidance 
notes to the standards: “measuring solely the volume of water pumped into the reticulation system or the time a handpump 
is in operation will not give an accurate indication of individual consumption. Household surveys, observation and 
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community discussion groups are a more effective method of collecting” (Sphere, 2004: 64). The house-to-house survey 
carried out by MSF in Adé, with more than 100 families showed significant differences in water access between IDPs and 
the local population: 
‐ 50% of IDP households of the main camp were getting less than 20 litres of water per person per day while, among 
local population (living near to tap-stands from the water scheme), this figure was only 20%.  
‐ 40% of IDP household of the main camp complained of long waiting time at the water point. This figure was 20% 
among local population. 
This survey revealed discrepancies hidden in calculated average values relatively close to Sphere minimum levels. IDPs 
were found to be in a worse situation than the local population. This can be partly explained by certain water systems 
(especially tap stands) being located in town, further away from the camps. Another factor was whether the household 
owned a donkey; this was an important factor because donkeys can assist with carrying far greater daily volumes of water. 
From a more general standpoint, it shows that in spite of the commitment of aid agencies to comply with Sphere standards, 
this goal was not achieved for a significant proportion of their primary target population.  
In terms of water quality, Sphere water supply standard number two recommends that: 
“Water is palatable, and of sufficient quality to be drunk and used for personal and domestic hygiene without causing 
significant risk to health” (Sphere, 2004: 66). 
 
Key indicators in this case are: 
‐ The absence of faecal coliforms (bacteria indicating the occurrence of faecal contamination); 
‐ Steps taken to minimise post-delivery contamination; 
‐ Disinfection revealed by the presence of residual chlorine if post-delivery contamination is suspected. This implies 
low turbidity (measured in Nephelometric Turbidity Units (NTU). Clear water has a turbidity level below 5 NTU). 
 
In Adé, water quality varied considerably depending on the source as shown in table 3: 
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Table 3: Level of compliance with Sphere standards in terms of water quality of water supply in Adé 
Source Turbidity measure 
(NTU) 
Overhead tank (Solidarités) <5 
Flexible Emergency tank (MSF) <5 
Manual pump 1 (Solidarités) 60 
Manual pump 2 (Solidarités) 20 
Manual pump 3 (Solidarités) 100 
Manual pump 4 (Solidarités) 20 
Manual pumps 5 & 6 (combined on one well, Solidarités) <5 
Open well (ICRC) 100 
Note: In Kerfi, all ten pumps provided water with turbidity levels below 5 NTU 
The survey showed that in Kerfi water provided, while insufficient in terms of quantity, was of good quality. In Adé, a 
majority of sources did not meet Sphere water quality standards however; a vast majority of IDPs considered that they had 
less water but of better quality than in their village of origin.  
Only the water distributed through the Adé’s network and at the MSF emergency water supply facility was disinfected with 
chlorine. Disinfecting water from manual pumps in both locations would have been useful given the high probability of 
post-delivery contamination. This aspect is covered by Sphere water supply standard number three, which specifies that 
people should have “adequate facilities and supplies to collect, store and use sufficient quantities of water for drinking, 
cooking, and personal hygiene, and to ensure that drinking water remains safe until it is consumed” (Sphere, 2004:69). 
IDPs received jerry cans both in Adé and Kerfi, however, these utensils got dirty quite quickly and no initiative was taken 
to disinfect them. 
Possible long-term scenarios 
In June 2009, IDPs living in Adé and Kerfi had been away from their home place for two to three years. If the situation 
described by the International Crisis Group as a ‘powder keg’ (ICG, 2009) did not improve, it would be unlikely that they 
could return home soon. However, the level of assistance they received from the agency had been steadily reducing. In 
terms of water supply, it had remained stable until the first months of 2009 but strategies since evolved towards trying to 
achieve greater sustainability: 
‐ In Adé, MSF was planning to dismantle their emergency water supply system by September 2009, when two new 
wells equipped with manual pumps built by Solidarités would be ready to use. Solidarités then planned to 
substitute the diesel generator by a solar system and to train municipal staff to run it. In the camps, the agency 
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promoted the creation of water committees in charge of organising the maintenance of the manual pumps. Repair 
costs would be funded by Adé’s residents given that the IDP population had very little cash.  
‐ A similar strategy was envisaged for the maintenance of manual pumps in Kerfi, where Oxfam promoted the 
creation of a water committee, which would organise the selling of water by the jerry-can in order to fund repair 
costs.  
‐ In both locations, spare-parts would have to be purchased in Goz Beida, where pump mechanics can be found. 
In June 2009, no money had actually been collected in Adé nor in Kerfi and this did not look like an easy task given that 
water committee members were at some point expecting to be paid by their supporting NGO only to attend meetings. In 
Adé, Solidarités would not acquiesce and was consequently in the process of facilitating capacity building of water 
committees. In Kerfi, Oxfam, based in Goz Beida since January 2009, somehow managed to work around the problem and 
achieved reasonable attendance from committee members but at that stage little else. Both NGOs were at the time of the 
visit ensuring the maintenance of the pumps, providing both spare-parts and manpower with the result that all the pumps 
were in satisfactory working condition.  
Once support from Solidarités and Oxfam ceases, the water committees that have been established will be expected to take 
over the maintenance of the pumps. However, it is more than likely that the quality and regularity of the maintenance of 
manual pumps is going to deteriorate. Initially, because implementing cost recovery is going to be difficult amongst a 
displaced population with little cash and other important priorities; this is particularly problematic if long-term maintenance 
costs have not been factored in at the earliest planning stages (see, Harvey and Reed 2006).  Harvey and Reed (2007) found 
that while community management (largely through the establishment of water committees) has been the prevalent model 
for donors and aid agencies such as Solidarités and Oxfam, this approach has not been the panacea it is often presented to 
be. Based upon research conducted in Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia, Harvey and Reed (2007) conclude that there is a 
strong need to distinguish between ‘community participation’ which is a prerequisite for sustainability, and ‘community 
management’ which is not (Harvey and Reed 2007).   
In addition to this issue, managing the operation and maintenance of manual pumps by the recipient community is difficult 
to undertake within a non-conflict or emergency scenario. For instance Harvey and Reed (2006) found that many rural water 
supplies in sub-Saharan Africa demonstrate high operational failure rates. They conclude that integrated service provision, 
appropriate technology choice and, where necessary, non-profit sector options can provide a more multifaceted and 
sustainable solution (Harvey and Reed 2006). Operational failure rates can therefore be exacerbated for IDPs who may lack 
formal education, are accustomed to drawing water from the wadis and with little capacity for independent management.  
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In this regard an assessment of NGO’s action in the region (including Adé and Kerfi) carried out by Groupe URD in May 
2009 points out insufficient dialog between humanitarian actors and the affected population, which leaves little hope for 
future community management of their newly acquired water systems. The report (Sokpoh et al. 2009) stresses the greater 
importance given to ‘hardware’ compared to the ‘software’ component of interventions, in other words, the preponderance 
of water system construction or installation (e.g. boreholes and handpumps) over  equally important aspects such as hygiene 
promotion or social mobilisation. The authors explain this by a preponderant accountability of humanitarian actors towards 
donors, in that it is more difficult to show the outcome of ‘software’ interventions compared to ‘hardware’ interventions that 
are always there to be seen. Reaching specific Sphere standards may also have played a role. In Adé and Kerfi, it is clear 
that, without regular external support, manual pumps are likely to break down one by one. The same applies to Adé’s solar 
system due to maintenance and renewal costs. IDPs and local population will then have to resort back to their traditional 
water source: the wadi. 
The dilemma behind water quality versus sustainability 
The situation in Adé and Kerfi illustrates a common problem that agencies involved in water supply in complex 
emergencies have to face but that Sphere does not adequately consider; the sustainability of water systems used in 
emergency situations. This translates into a difficult technological choice:  
‐ Deciding to set up systems quickly effective and providing quality water but the systems are subsequently too 
complex or expensive for the recipient population to operate and maintain; 
‐ or opting for simpler systems, which may take longer to complete and may not always meet Sphere water quality 
standards but requiring little or no maintenance and are affordable to the recipient population. 
This choice has potential consequences, especially on health. The issue may therefore be considered as a moral one since 
aid agencies have to decide whether it is morally acceptable to lower water quality standards, and potentially expose 
recipient populations to disease in order to ensure sustainable service.  In other words, they have to decide whether it is 
better to supply good quality water for a limited time period or average quality water over a longer time period.  
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Technological options, timing, and sustainability 
A wide range of technological options are available to aid agencies in an emergency. Water can be transported from a 
distance by truck if no water source is locally available. Water may also be available locally, in which case possible sources 
are rainwater, surface water, springs, dug wells and boreholes. In the IDP camps of Eastern Chad, water trucking, springs 
and rainwater are not really feasible options and surface water is only seasonal (wadis). Dug wells and boreholes are 
therefore the only possible options, as it shows when looking at the existing water systems in Adé and Kerfi. Water from 
dug wells can be extracted by buckets or by manual pumps. Most manual pumps are produced industrially (e.g. Vergnet), 
some models however such as rope and washer pumps are designed to be built and maintained with local materials (suitable 
until approximately 20 metres depth). Water from shallow boreholes could be extracted with Blair buckets, which are the 
borehole version of ordinary buckets used in dug wells (Skinner 2003). In most cases however borehole water is pumped 
with industrially produced manual pumps. 
In an emergency, time needed to set up a water system is an important parameter when selecting a technology: 
‐ Dug wells are labour intensive and require a lot of equipment and expertise, especially for state-of-the art 
construction. Time needed to dig and equip a well obviously depends on the depth of the water-table and on the 
nature of the geological formations found (usually between one week and two months); 
‐ Many technologies are available for drilling boreholes. These range from hand-drills, that are adapted for shallow 
boreholes, to drilling rigs that are suitable for accessing deep watersheds. Drilling rigs are expensive and in most 
cases, they are mobilised for a campaign of several wells, which requires expertise and important logistical means. 
Jetted wells are another method very commonly used in emergencies. This method consists of circulating water 
down through a small diameter steel pipe; the water fluidizes the soil and allows the pipe to sink. This technique is 
only suitable for loose formation, especially alluvial, deposits besides rivers (Davis and Lambert, 2002). Jetted 
wells require specific hand-pumps because of the small diameter or the casing (usually 50 mm). Well jetting is 
probably the fastest drilling method although it cannot go very deep. Mobilizing a rig takes longer, although once it 
is on the spot, it can create a large number of new water points relatively fast (albeit with the risk of a few ‘dry 
holes’). 
Once a technological option is chosen, operation and maintenance of the system may depend to a great extend on support 
from the aid agency. When the emergency situation perpetuates, this becomes an important factor when looking at the 
sustainability of the system: 
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‐ Dug wells don’t require external support when water is extracted with rope and bucket. The sustainability of the 
system is more questionable when water is extracted with a manual pump. In this respect, rope and washer pumps 
seem to be the best option because they may be built and repaired locally. However, they can only reach a limited 
depth of about 20 metres. Nonetheless, if the community is unable to repair a manual pump set up on a well, it is 
likely to remove it and revert to using rope and bucket. 
‐ Boreholes can be equipped with electric submersible pumps powered with solar energy, or with manual pumps. 
The former is more expensive to set up but may function without external support, at least during a certain time 
provided a few members of the community are trained to operate them and as long as the solar panels are not 
stolen. The operation and maintenance of manual pumps depends on locally available spare parts, and on the ability 
and willingness of the IDP population to pay for the maintenance. Blair buckets are only suitable for shallow 
boreholes and when the number of users is not too extensive. They may also break but can be repaired locally. 
The various technological options, the time needed to set them up and their level of sustainability are summarised in 
Table 4: 
Table 4: Water systems options: Timeframe and constraints versus sustainability 
Technological 
Option 
Timeframe/ 
Constraints 
Sustainability 
Dug wells May take 
time to dig 
and equip 
(up to a 
month), 
involves 
heavy 
logistics. 
Open well equipped with rope and bucket: Does not require specific external 
support. 
Well equipped with conventional manual pump: 
Depends on the efficiency of a water committee, on the availability of spare-parts 
and on the ability and willingness to pay from users. Pump can be dismantled and 
the well used with rope and bucket. 
Well equipped with rope and washer pump: 
Depends on the efficiency of a water committee and on the presence of a mechanic 
able to build and maintain the pump. Pump can be dismantled and the well used 
with rope and bucket. 
Boreholes Drilling rigs:  
May take 
time to 
mobilise and 
involves 
heavy 
logistics. 
Once on the 
spot, can 
drill several 
wells 
Borehole equipped with a conventional manual pump: 
Depends on the efficiency of a water committee, on the availability of spare-parts 
and mechanic and on the ability and willingness to pay from users. 
 
Boreholes equipped with solar pump: 
Depends on people in charge of basic maintenance and on solar panels not being 
stolen. 
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relatively 
fast.  
Jetted well: 
Fast to drill, 
basic 
handpumps 
Jetted well equipped with a specific hand-pump: 
Depends on the efficiency of a water committee, on the availability of spare-parts 
and mechanic for this hand-pump and on the ability and willingness to pay from 
users. 
Hand-drilled 
well: 
Fast once a 
team is 
trained and 
equipped.  
Hand-drilled well equipped with Blair bucket: 
Does not require external support but depends on the presence of a mechanic able 
to repair the bucket when needed. 
 
Technological options, water quality, and impact on health 
 A choice has to be made between dug wells and boreholes. The latter may be faster to drill and equip and tend to provide a 
water of a better quality (as was observed in Kerfi). Nonetheless, in terms of sustainability, a dug well equipped with a rope 
and bucket can be a far superior option.  
Boreholes water may contain iron and manganese, which affects taste, odour and colour, but has little or no impact on 
health. In certain regions, more severe problems, such as the presence of fluoride and arsenic may be observed. However, in 
general, borehole water is clear and at the source, pathogen-free. In contrast, dug well water may be turbid, especially in the 
case of shallow wells dug next to rivers and are vulnerable to contamination, especially from the bucket, when no manual 
pump is used. 
The impact on health of this technological choice is determined by the difference in quality between dug well water and 
borehole water. Measuring health impact of water and sanitation interventions has been the object of the large number of 
studies. A well-known article by Esrey et al. (1991) reports on a meta-analysis of a large number of studies. The authors 
conclude on the respective effects of improving water quality, water quantity, sanitation and hygiene on morbidity and 
mortality due to waterborne and excreta-related diseases. One of the conclusions of the article is that increasing water 
quantity alone contributes to a reduction of 20% in diarrhoeal diseases while the result is 15% for water quality.  These 
results are nonetheless contradicted by a similar analysis carried out more recently by Fewtrell and Colford (2004), which 
concludes on a greater effect on diarrhoea morbidity of water quality interventions. However, the water quality interventions 
reviewed in this study refers specifically to point of use water treatment and not to the delivery of high-quality water at the 
source, which may be contaminated later on due to the conditions of storage. In this respect Kerfi is a perfect illustration: 
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water may be of excellent quality at the pump, but the dirtiness of water vessels used by IDPs cast doubts on its quality 
when consumed.  
These studies show that the importance given to the delivery of high quality water at the point of extraction, often at the cost 
of water quantity and sustainability of supply cannot be justified on health grounds. Other important factors such as 
conditions of storage must be considered. This makes dug well technology appear more acceptable on moral grounds. It is 
argued that adoption of a less technocratic approach (i.e. not using the large machinery required for drilling boreholes) 
would not necessarily pose an increased threat to the health of the populations that agencies such as ‘Solidarités’ and Oxfam 
intend to help. Encompassing water quality and sustainability would even be possible according to the research carried out 
by Sutton and Nkolomo (2003) in Zambia. The authors suggest that simple structural improvements for dug wells (such as 
lining the top parts of the wells with bricks or concrete and providing a suitably designed concrete apron at the surface level 
of the well) can considerably improve the bacteriological quality of the water. Community members may then gradually 
improve their water supply adding items such as storage facilities or water extraction systems ranging from windlass to 
handpumps or even solar pumps and water schemes (Sutton and Nkolomo, 2003). This may be hard to imagine in Adé and 
Kerfi but aid agencies can easily dig state of the art improved dug wells (Solidarités and ICRC have already achieved this in 
Adé), with or without handpumps. The quality of the water at the point of use could then be intrinsically linked to the 
effectiveness of the hygiene campaigns carried out by agencies. For that to be successful it is important for the agencies to 
initially improve their dialog with communities as recommended by Groupe URD (Sokpoh et al. 2009). More health 
benefits could also be drawn from promoting point of use treatments such as the individual sand filters tested by Solidarités 
in Adé and adapted both to the treatment of dug well and wadi water. Groupe URD considers this initiative as beneficial 
provided the organisation find a way of building them with local materials that would make the solutions more sustainable 
(Sokpoh et al. 2009: 22). 
Conclusions 
“Size doesn’t matter in effective humanitarian response: timing, access and competence do”. (Gostelow, 1999). The author 
of this statement refers to what is the conventional understanding of timing and competence in this context: timing for 
assistance and competence to deliver aid as fast as possible with specific quality standards. This paper intends to show that, 
in the case of water supply in complex emergencies timing and competence may have multiple dimensions. Time is also to 
be considered when adopting a strategy for assistance to populations that may be stranded away from their familiar 
environment for ages. Likewise, considering long-term solutions also require from those in charge of designing assistance 
operations, different competences, comparable to what development professionals need.   
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The cases of Adé and Kerfi, which are certainly not unique, show that achieving the quality levels in water supply 
recommended by Sphere may jeopardise the very existence of water supply in the long term because of technological 
choices that may be imposed. The corresponding levels of water quality are therefore seen as linked to the rights to dignity 
that Sphere is meant to ensure for the affected population (Sphere, 2004:5). However, the purposely universal character of 
Sphere makes it difficult to select which set of moral values this right is based upon (Dufour et al., 2004). Nonetheless if it 
is accepted, as stated by Walker that “humanitarianism is cast in the mould of the West” (Walker, 2005: 333), it is probably 
Western values that are taken as reference. This means opting for delivering water of a quality compatible with what 
Westerners would accept to drink, even if such levels of quality may be far-fetched from what the affected population is 
used to drinking, and could afford without external support. 
If the rights promulgated by Sphere cannot last beyond the withdrawal of agencies providing assistance, then some of the 
Sphere standards may, in the long run be counterproductive. Moreover, agencies accepting this situation may see their 
accountability towards the affected population questioned. 
A possible solution could be that Sphere adapts its standards introducing a temporal dimension. The large number of 
‘lasting emergencies’ requires ‘lasting relief’, which would be in line with developmental relief, as pointed out by Walker 
(2005).  In such circumstances, the standards or their guidelines should encourage agencies to consider the evolution of the 
type of assistance provided over time. This concern is in part addressed in guidance note 4 of ‘Common Standard 1: 
Participation’, which states: “A disaster response programme should support and/or complement existing services and local 
institutions in terms of structure and design and be sustainable after the external assistance stops” (Sphere, 2004:29). 
However, this note does not define indicators that would estimate the sustainability of the response. Water supply guidelines 
mention that “Water sources and systems are maintained such that appropriate quantities of water are available 
consistently or on a regular basis” (Sphere, 2004:63), but do not specify who should ensure this maintenance and how it 
should be carried out. In this respect, considering indicators such as the level of maintenance required, the availability of 
spare parts and the presence of trained personnel, would provide criteria on how to plan a maintenance system. Agencies 
would then have to accompany their withdrawal by gradually substituting the quickly set-up, and too often unsustainable 
systems, with a system that the recipient populations can afford to operate and maintain. The key is then to minimise the gap 
between the systems installed by aid agencies and what IDPs/refugees are accustomed to. Insecurity that may lead to 
premature withdrawal or limited presences of agencies makes the realisation of ‘sustainable relief’ even more fundamental. 
Sustainable water systems require appropriate technological choices. In a context such as Eastern Chad, boreholes equipped 
with manual pumps may be justified at the early stage of an emergency but they should be seconded with hand-dug wells, 
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which can provide acceptable water quality if they are properly designed and equipped (gravel pack filtering systems may 
be especially important). Hygiene promotion / community mobilisation are also important factors contributing to 
sustainability and water quality by encouraging people to maintain hygienic conditions both at the point of water extraction 
and at the point of use.  
This strategy is a trade-off between technological solutions and sustainability, which should in the long run bring 
appropriate and sustainable health benefits. It is only a matter of time. 
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